

E. #1785

DOCUMENT NO. 5578

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C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report to a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

"Report concerning Criminals of War Working Party Flores,
drawn up by Capt. A.C.J. de THOUARS, Ldst soldier C.K. BRANTS
and Res. 1st Lt. H.H.J. de VRIES, No. OM 205/E,"

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE:

(
/s/ (Ch. Jongeneel)
(S E A L)
BATAVIA, June 7th 1946

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the office of the Attorney General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

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CRIMINALS OF WAR WORKING PARTY FLORES

As criminals of war are considered all Japanese instances, authorities and military men (Korean guards incl.) who can be made responsible for, we well as those directly or indirectly concerned with, the undermentioned facts that are regarded as war crimes:

- A. The using of Ps/W to execute military works, viz. unloading war materials (benzine, oil, aeroplane bombs) and designing military airbases.

Reference is made to which is mentioned in enclosed report.

Responsible herefore are held the Japanese command of the P.O.W. camps in the area concerned and the possible higher military instance which gave orders hereto to this command.

- B. To make a working party as the undermentioned of a great number of Ps/W who on account of their age, physical condition and/or condition of health ought not to have been brought into consideration.

Reference to statement sub "Composition of transport"

Responsible herefore are the instances mentioned sub A, the medical authorities, who on 18th April 1943 inspected at Tjimahi the departing persons, the senior officer who addressed them on April previous to 18th at Sourabaya and possible also the Japanese camp commandant ASHITA who the day before inspected them personally.

- C. The transport of Ps/W to Flores under conditions (want of accommodation and hygienic supplies on the ships, inadequate food, want of medicines and heavy unloading work), that inevitably led to weakening, illness and death.

Reference to statement on "Outward voyage Sourabaya-Flores".

Responsible herefore are the instances mentioned sub A/ and persons, the authorities specially charged with the regulation of the voyage, and the on one of the vessels travelling commandant ASHITA, who neglected to make rules to ameliorate the situation.

- D. The transport of Ps/W Flores on ships that carried i.a. benzine, oil and aeroplane bombs, as well as using the Ps/W to unload this cargo at places more or less exposed to bombardments (f.i. Laoeteng and Koepang), this without practising safety rules.

Reference is made to the statement sub "Outward voyage Sourabaya - Flores (via Timor)".

Responsible herefore are the instances mentioned sub C and the authorities with the exception of ASHITA (insofar as he at least in the point had no influence or authority).

- E. To make Ps/W reside at Macemore (Flores) during many weeks without any covering, in the open air (incl. hundreds of sick people, amongst whom many serious cases); in which conditions nursing of the patients was practically impossible through utter lack of hygienic supplies and the number of cases and deaths in this period increases in jumps.

For further details reference is made to the report sub III "Stay at Flores" under the headings "Blom-Camp" - Material care, 1st and 2nd Sickcamp (So-called Wulff-Camps) - Material care and health condition".

/ Responsible

Responsible herefore are the instances and persons mentioned sub A the P/W Command at Ambon (under which resort also Flores fell), the camp commandant ASHITA and possibly the directing medical authorities (in as far as these knowing about the bad health conditions nevertheless neglected to have measures taken.

- F. The transport thereafter of Ps/W in barracks in which accommodation, hygienic supplies etc. offered insufficient opportunity to prevent further spreading of diseases and to attain recovery of the already present patients, and of which the main part of the camp was situated in such a way in regard to the contiguous aerodrome, that there was continuous danger of bomb ardnments and/or machinegunning, without there being any decisive safety measures.

Reference is made to information re this in the report sub III "Stay at Flores" under the headings "Blom-camp-Material care-Safety/protection, "1st and 2nd Sick-Camp (also-called Wulff-camps) - Material care.

- G. Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities sub E. To supply inadequate food (which caused weakening and greater susceptibility for diseases and also deteriorated the possibilities for recovery of the sick seriously) and insufficient medicines (which made recovery of many ill people and the prophylactic administration of medicines - specially quinine - impossible). For further details reference is made to the report sub III "Stay at Flores" under the headings "Blomp-camp & 1st and 2nd sick-camps (so-called Wulff-camps) - Material care,

Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities mentioned sub E, the Japanese sergeant and orderly NAKAHARA and the Korean hospital soldier (in as far as this one on his own account and purposely limited the supply of medicines still further), the Korean intendant and guards, who regularly the meat meant for Ps/W and other things used for themselves and those Korean guard commandants and guards who most often the Central Purchase to get restoratives (egs f.i.) from the suppliers.

- H. To employ Ps/W in places exposed to attacks of allies planes (aerodromes, ports), as well as have them carry out heavy duties under unfavorable conditions (long working hours, inadequate food, etc.) and by persons not fit for it (amongst others ill persons indicated by the guard OYAMA).

Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities mentioned sub A, as well as the Japanese and Korean military men who are guilty, directly or indirectly, of above mentioned.

- J. The absolute lack of immediate management by the Japanese camp commandant and his subaltern officers (excl. Aoki), the practical impossibility for the Netherlands camp commandant to contact firstmentioned, and to obtain any amelioration with lastmentioned (excl. Aoki)

Reference to report sub III "Stay at Flores" behaviour of the guards.

Responsible herefore are the authorities mentioned sub A, the Japanese camp commandant and subaltern officers.

- K. The execution of the escaped Ps/W Visser and the murder of the P/W Borgman.

Reference to report sub III "Stay at Flores" - Execution/murder.

Responsible herefore are the Japanese camp commandant, all high authorities, who ordered or approved of Visser's execution and / possible

possible the Korean guard, who shot Borgman.

- L. The death of 214 Ps/W during the transport to/from and the stay at Flores, without mentioning the later occurring deaths and the permanent weakening of tens other victims of this working party.

Responsible herefore are all abovementioned sub A up till and including I instances, authorities, officers, subaltern officers and men.

- I. The utterly unnecessary torturing, beating, maltreating, of and wresting and stealing from Ps/W by the greater part of the Korean Guard and the maltreatment by the interpreter ASUMA, against which the Japanese camp commandant and his N.C.O.'s (sergeant major Aoki Excepted) did not act, or if he did inadequately.

Further details in report sub II "Stay at Flores" - behaviour of guards.

Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities sub A, as well as the Japanese and Korean military men, who directly or indirectly have been guilty abovementioned.

I. COMPOSITION OF TRANSPORT

Because at present the completed details about the composition of the Flores-transport cannot be disposed of, we have to be satisfied with the information that the total number of 2079 men consisted of a contingent of 1974 men for the P/W camp at Tjimahi (4th/9th bataljon) and the remainder of 105 men from the P/W camp at Sourabaya (Jaarmarkt) - resulting in the liquidation of this camp. Attention is drawn to the fact the contingent from Tjimahi especially consisted of a great number of older and physically weak people, apparent from the fact that the death list of this transport counted 90 deceased of above 40 years of age, ex-Tjimahi.

It is accepted that the Japanese authorities

- a. who ordered the composition of the Tjimahi-contingent of this transport to the Netherlands commandant of the P/W camp at that place;
- b. who inspected the Ps/W who were indicated by lastmentioned for this transport, on 16th April 1943 in the presence of the Netherlands camp commandant at Tjimahi,
- c. who visited the departing on the morning of embarkation (April 1943) at Sourabaya (Jaarmarkt, namely the senior officer who addressed them on that occasion.

Beforehand must have known the destination of the voyage, as well as the transport condition, the accommodation at Flores and other things, as well as the duty-work to be done there.

Apart from the question in how far the health condition and age of the indicated Ps/W was taken into consideration in the instruction to the Netherlands camp commandant at Tjimahi, it has to be stated that the Japanese authorities at abovementioned inspection in any case could have been that it could be accepted of a great part of the persons who were not excluded on account of their health, and later taken of this list, that they on account of their age and physical condition reasonably could have been equal to the voyage and the employment. This not in connection with the second question whether at that moment they knew that among the indicated persons there were a number of those who recently had been dismissed from hospital and were not quite recovered yet, and whether they knew that among those who were left behind (about men) there were adequate young and strong persons to take the place in the transport for the unfit.

Although

Although it is to be doubted whether the Japanese commandant of the transport, Lt. ASHITA, at the moment he held the inspection prior to the departure from Sourabaya, might have been able to make alterations, it must be stated, that mentioned ASHITA ought to have known that after a number of sick, weak and older (above 50 years of age) people had been singled out, part of the departing was not strong enough to outlive this escapade.

In any case ASHITA who was conversant with the age and outward appearance of the departing, utterly neglected to take this into consideration during the voyage and the stay at Flores.

OUTWARD VOYAGE SOURABAYA - FLORES (via TIMOR).

EMBARKMENT AT SOURABAYA

Hygienic supplies.

By the way of a "show" the people who had to embark were gathered in an open shed used for manganeto ore, and were disinfected by a group of Japanese orderlies dressed in white coats and with mouth-masks, that is to say packed and loaded as they were with their luggage they had to walk along a pumping apparatus and were bedusted with an unknown liquid. (This is only mentioned as a contrast of this comedy on the one side and the bad conditions, hygienic during the progress of this voyage on the other side.

Behaviour of the guards.

Already directly after arrival at Sourabaya the Korean guards started to act palpably. During embarkation the "big luggage" (field sacks etc.) was roughly snatched away from the Ps/W and flung on a stack; the men themselves were driven into the holds with pushes, beatings and bad language.

SEA VOYAGE SOURABAYA - MACMERE (FLORES).

Material care.

Accommodation. The accommodation on each of the three ships was absolutely inadequate. In the between decks were sleeping places of wood at the height of one meter, on which and under which there was only room for the Ps/W, when all sat down hunched up; part of the people stayed and slept on the uncovered upper deck (in between the winches, in the machine-oil, and up and under the freight cars, next to the pigsties and the latrines) and all this often during heavy rains at night; as a result thereof the situation in the hold became better; to lay down stretched out, however, was impossible, there was no passage, the light was inadequate or there was no light at all. Therefore it was impossible for many (especially for stomach-patient) to reach the latrine on the upper decks in time, so that the excrements dropped along the ladders in the holds and the sleeping places and soiled those sleeping under it; respectively infected them. Especially the first nights many slept standing upright. Protest with the Japanese guards resulted in the advice to sleep in turns. The abovementioned counted for the s.s. "Tasima Maru" ad about 7000 tons (on which the between deck of hold II and the midship's between deck were available for 1030 men, but 150 to 200 men stayed on deck uncovered, which stay was still made more difficult when between Dilly and Koepang 3 loading prahoes still more limited the sleeping places and hindered the ventilation in the holds) as well as for the s.s. "Tensio Maru" ad 5000 to 6000 tons (here the between deck of hold I and in the beginning part of the centrecastle at starboard was available for 945 men); Concerning last mentioned ship it is told that after a few days the Ps/W were removed from the centrecastle and first / had

had to find places on deck upon hold II and later on (after unloading at Dilly Laoeteng and Koepang) when already part of the men were sick, together with others in the hold of health I viz. upon a row of standing drums, filled with oil and benzine. The third ship of about 4500 tons (name unknown) contained 104 Ps/W who together with 200 to 300 coolies from Singapore (Malays, Chinese, British Indians) and a number of Madurese prahoe-skipperers were lodged in the betweendeck of hatch I which also had wooden places to sleep; outstretched position was possible, but the room in width was very narrow; At Koepang accommodation got still worse because in the same hold a number of sick and, during the bombing of the aerodrome at night there, hurt Japanese were lodged.

Hygienic supplies. The hygienic supplies on the ships were very inadequate. The latrine-sheds built of wood and alongside the gangway of the fore-part of the ship contained at the most 6 squatting places and 2 urinaries, which were often closed (during unloading f.i.) or reserved for the Japanese; The decline of the gutter and the amount of water available were insufficient; the waste-pipe outside the deck was too short causing the excrements to be spread over the deck at the smallest gust of wind even, and especially over the only place where the food had to be distributed and in the neighbourhood whereof the greater part of the Ps/W had to eat. The lack of latrines was apparent through the fact because of the long queues which practically night and day were waiting in front of the lavatories many were forced to discharge on deck which especially at night caused many sources of infection. The abovementioned counts for all three ships to about the same extent. The "Tasima Maru" as well as the "Tensio Maru" had a latrine shed at starboard and at larboard with 3 squatting places and 1 urinary, which larboard shed of lastmentioned vessel practically the whole day reserved for the Japanese, whilst at firstmentioned ship part of the latrines at irregular intervals was closed for Ps/W. On the third ship only 2 of the 3 squatting places in the latrineshed were available for the 104 Ps/W and 250 coolies, whilst there was no urinary. Opportunity to bathe and wash was at none of the ships, the little water which the Ps/W sometimes got was as a rule hardly enough to wash up the eating pans. The washing of clothes was out of the question which had disastrous result for many stomach-patient naturally. To get rid of rubbish was not taken care of (and to throw it overboard is forbidden in times of war).

Medical Care. The medicines especially meant and packed for this voyage were said to be put away in the hold at an unapproachable place. For this reason the repeated requests of our doctors to give some medicines, dressing material and disinfectants were refused; the supply thereof could only come from the very limited amount which our doctors and orderlies possessed. Needless to say what this meant during the extension of the number of stomach-patients (who mainly could be treated with magnesium sulphate and porridge diet) and infected wounds (as a result from the unloading duties). There was no room to nurse, to treat or to isolate. An improvised uncovered nursingroom on the poopdeck of the s.s. "Tasima Maru", as well as a shed situated behind the kitchen and used as "isolation shed", which gave place for 3 patients appeared to be utterly insufficient. On the s.s. "Tensio Maru" there was no nursingroom available; in the last days a little corner on the upperdeck was needed for seriously

ill dysentery cases. Bed pans were not available on any of the ships; serious cases had to use a limited number of little tubs and bucket, which through lack of water could not be cleaned sufficiently.

Food supplies. The food supply on all ships was wholly inadequate. The food mainly consisted of small amounts of rice and waloe, sometimes added with a little meat or fish, or left-overs from the Japanese kitchen. Usually the meals were limited to 2 per day. On the s.s. "Tensio Maru" the food was cooked with seawater - in order to economize on salt - and the rice that was always served as a porridge was mixed with undigestible kedelehbeans; this last fact added to the quick extension of the number of stomach patients; the 104 Ps/W on the ship with unknown name have been privileged above the others to a certain extent because they had the same food as the 250 coolies traveling with them. The distribution of drink was limited to 2 cups "tea" per day on every ship and thus also inadequate.

DUTIES.

Sport of duty. During the voyage the duties existed of heavy unloading at Dilly, Laoeteng and Koepang, at a quick rate and during continuous chasing up. Moreover, the people often had to stand in the water more than waist high during hours to land the goods (bombs, benzine, oil, and food) from the unloading crafts. That this added to the quick extension of the number of stomach-patients is self-explanatory.

Physical condition of the working parties. Not mentioning the fact that the bad accommodation and food during the previous days of the voyage in general already deteriorated the condition of the Ps/W and a great number on account of their age, physical condition and their not being in training was totally inefficient for this work, it has to be stated, that on s.s. "Tasima Maru" also had to go on duty those Ps/W who were declared ill by our doctors and they were beaten out of the holds by the guards. Therefore it is not very amazing that f.i. it happened on the "Tasima Maru" that out of the 300 on duty 100 men had to return to the ship on account of stomach troubles and exhaustion.

Duration of the duty/Rests. The unloading duties lasted about from 8 o'clock a.m. to 8 p.m. and sometimes (f.i. at Koepang) until far after midnight. The rests during the duties usually was very short as well as the official rests (for meals); at Koepang even no rest was given during the last day. The food was distributed by the ships. The drinking supply was short and at Koepang often inadequate.

Safety/safe-guarding.

On board the ships. During unloading at Dilly, Laoeteng and Koepang it appeared that the cargo of the ships amongst other things consisted of a considerable amount of benzine, oil and aeroplane bombs, which were located on the forepart of the ship in the holds under the between-decks, where the Ps/W stayed. The abovementioned counts for each of the 3 ships, and also has to be mentioned the fact that on the s.s. "Tensio Maru" during the last part of the voyage a remainder of filled benzine - and oil-drums in the hold under hatch I were placed. In the quality of safe-guarding there were sloops, enough for a cargo ship crew in normal times. Moreover, a limited number of rafts and a heap of life-belts, which were not allowed to be distributed. Each ship was supplied with A.A. battery (incl. operators) which was used during the / bombing

bombing of the aerodrome Koepang on the s.s. "Tasima Maru" lying on the roads. The ships have been convoyed during the whole voyage by a Japanese corvette.

During duty-work. During unloading at Dilly, Laoeteng and Koepang (which 2 lastmentioned places regularly subject to bombing) no regulations or precautions for the safety / safeguarding of the Ps/W who had to land the contraband were taken. During the bombing of the aerodrome at Koepang in the night of 7/8 May 1943 those on duty ashore had to try to find cover on their own initiative.

Health condition. The bad accommodation, the very bad hygienic precautions, the fact that it was impossible to do proper nursing, the inadequate food and the heavy unloading duties have been the causes that the health condition grew worse every day. At the disembarkation at Macemere f.i. there were already 126 dysentery cases amongst the Ps/W of s.s. "Tasima Maru", 63 of which (incl. 25 very) serious. It was the same on the other ships, only the amounts were smaller.

Deaths. On May 1943 the first victim died of dysentery and heart-berri2 on the s.s. "Tasima Maru". Although a funeral ashore was possible as the ship was in the Koepang roads, a request there-to was refused and the corpse was put overboard after leaving Koepang. On board the third (name unknown) ship lying on the Macemere roads on 11th May 1943 the second death occurred.

Behaviour of guards. Japanese commandant and N.C.O.'s. The Japanese commandant as well as the Japanese N.C.O.'s never minded the Ps/W during the voyage and left the management entirely to the Korean guards; the Japanese interpreter ASUMA, who personally maltreated (beating with a piece of wood and kicking) a number of Ps/W.

Korean guards. Although these men were not yet "in full swing" on the ships, some of them amongst others the guards TAMURA and MATSUOKA who on the s.s. "Tasima Maru" beat the sick out of the holds for duty-work (as already mentioned above) directly applied themselves to beating and maltreating. It is remarkable that as from the disembarkation on this point they inspired.

DEBARKATION AT MACEMERE.

s.s. "Tasima Maru" the Ps/W of this ship were disembarked on the 10th of May 1943. During this the sick had to wait in a lighter alongside for a tugboat during 2 hours in the burning sun. After they had waited a considerable time on a shadowless tennis court (where they had to discharge in gutters and slokans) the serious cases were transported on trucks to the coconut garden announced as a hospital, which later became known as the 1st Wulff camp (so undermentioned). The less seriously ill patients originally would have been transported by truck, but finally they had to walk to their destination (1½ km). The healthy Ps/W instantaneously had to start unloading the ship and only arrived in "camp" at night at about 11 o'clock.

s.s. "Tensio Maru". On May the 11th, 1943, the Ps/W of this ship were disembarked. The Korean Guards crammed the landing sloops under much shouting and beating, with healthy as well as with sick persons (amongst whom very serious cases); for the embarkation of lastmentioned no precautions were made, neither for the stay on board the sloops (the greater part had to stand). Most of the people had to stay on the uncovered tennis court from about 10 a.m. until 3 a.m. and to discharge gutter, slokans buckets and basins had to be used. The sick persons (incl. the very ill) finally had to walk staggering to the "1st Wulff camp" (as mentioned above), notwithstanding transport by car had been promised; the healthy departed walking to the coconut garden, located 3 km East from Macemere, which later on became the "Blom camp"./IIISTAY

OM 206/E

III STAY AT FLORES"BLOM CAMP"Material Care

Accommodation. When the healthy Ps/W arrived on May 10th, 1943 about 5 p.m. in the coconut garden meant as a "camp" and situated on the shore 3 km East of Macemere (see sketch, App. A), accommodation consisted of 2 native houses, which the guards immediately took. The Ps/W had to lie down in the open air, with hardly time to unpack or to spread out their mats and (during the next weeks) they were unable often to fix their mosquito-nets, having no means of doing so. This to a great extent caused the malaria epidemics later on; This situation lasted for until, after about 2 weeks the first barracks were ready (the building of which could begin after the harbour-duties were finished). First the "healthy" people were lodged the sick got over last (after 4 weeks). The barracks were primitive, people had to sleep on the ground (not before September were the rattan bunks made and put up), the roofs were far from water tight because of the coconut trees standing in the barracks and the barracks near the road suffered from dust, caused by the bullock-carts which was made worse by the aeroplanes on the aerodrome; the lack of gutters - which were made later on - caused the rain to drain into the barracks. Special attention has to be drawn to the fact that no workers were available to improve camp or hospital. At night until the signal "lights out" (8.30) a small oil lamp was the only illumination.

Hygienic precautions. As a nursing room for the first weeks a fenced off part of the coconut garden was used for this "sick garden" as a matter of fact was at intervals cleared by the transfer of serious cases to the sick-camp ("1st Wulff-camp"), but the finally the sick barracks were the last ready, the inconveniences of these sheds (constructed in the same way as the workers-sheds) showed themselves still more (m.i.) lack of sleeping bunks and the patients having to kneel for the doctors and orderlies was especially demonstrated when Dr. SCHOCREL had to operate upon a patient for appendicitis in the "kolong" under the floor of the so-called "doctors' house" (in which the medical department was lodged); the dust falling from the roof was caught by blankets. Medicines were supplied inadequately. Thus it happened f.i. during many serious malaria epidemics that there was no quinine available for weeks, and only to patients with a temperature of over 40 degree pills could given this was apparent when this resulted in malaria comatosa, in which cases the lack of quinine invariably caused death. Only a few thermometers were available. For dysentery and other stomach diseases English salt was used; medicines were distributed only in very serious cases from those held by the doctors and orderlies. The same applies also to beri beri and other diseases for which medicines were inadequate. There were hardly ever sufficient dressing used.

Preparations of yeast, kadeleh-milk, extracts of Djohar leaves, and patar-hading rind and such like had to make up for the lack of medicines. The distribution of restoratives was out of the question; the only thing that could be done was to buy eggs which were offered at intervals in small quantities and usually were claimed by the Korean guards. The result was that many (for the greater part infected) wounds were cause.

Clothing.

Clothing. To wear/carry along upperclothing was forbidden workers; pants hung like rags round their bodies as a result of inadequate means of repairing and heavy wear, also through the washing with sea-water (originally without soap). Only after many months a limited amount of graygreen clothing mostly in too small sizes was distributed.

Safety/Safe-guarding.

In the camp. Enclosed drawing of the situation (Encl.A) points out the very dangerous location of the camp near the aerodrome. (The end of the main landing strip was at a distance of 75 m from the barracks). Even if they wished to spare the adjacent Ps/W camp during a possible bombing, would be very much endangered. The same counts for a possible machine-gun attack on the adjacent Japanese barracks and those of the Korean guards. The Japanese also saw this proves the facts that a Japanese sergeant-major expressed himself in the presence of some Ps/W as above. Protection against airplane attacks was not present in the first months. Later open (parallel to the road and the shore) not very deep trenches were constructed, whilst still later a primitive camouflage was made (leaves upon the barracks); not considering the question whether these precautions ameliorated the safety of the Ps/W or not.

During the fatigue work. Precautions were neglected on the very vulnerable aerodrome work; in case of an allied attack the order was to try to seek cover as well as on the airbase itself there was not enough care taken to safe-guard as appears from the fact that had the Ps/W put dynamite into pits despite the protests of the leader because no precautions were taken and whilst the Japanese themselves looked on from a considerable distance. Also with the harbour duties the risks were still greater (the Japanese airplanes were continually in the air and American planes machine-gunned a convoy entering the harbour (Mid.July 1 1943) every precautions were lacking. There were no shelters and the order was lately: go on working in case of air alarm and only look for cover when the airplanes appeared, bombing or strafing.

1st & 2nd Sick Camps (so-called "Wulff-Camps")

The coconut garden within which on the 10th of May 1943, the sick and healthy Ps/W from the s.s. "Tasima Maru" and on about 11th May 1943 the sick from the s.s. "Tensio Maru" were lodged, remained after the departure (about the 20th May) of the healthy people, exclusively a sick camp (the so-called 1st "Wulff-camp"); on June 10th this camp was transferred as a whole to a barracks camp (the so-called 2nd "Wulff-Camp" which in the meantime had been built in the neighbourhood (about 300 m) and that was liquidated on to the sick department of the "Blom-Camp").

Material care.

Accommodation. In the "1st Wulff-camp" there was no accommodation at all, except a kampong house and a store room that were taken by the Korean guards the first day and thereafter used as a dispensary and a store. Hundreds of sick as well as doctors and nurses, lay in the open air on the ground and the only cover was a number of hastily made improvised covers of mosquito nets (partially covered with banana leaves) for the most serious cases. The latter were transferred in 2 cases of heavy rain to an open goat stable; in one of these cases (29th May 1943) 2 men died in the dark whilst they lay there crowded, without bed-pans and making each other dirty. This appeared when daylight came; The transfer on 10th of July 1943 to the "2nd Wulff-camp" (which lasted, for lack of stretchers, from 10.30 a.m. / until

until 10.30 p.m.) made the situation no better insofar that part of the patients could be lodged in 2 barracks accommodating 400 men normally, but now 550 sick; it was constructed the same way as the "Blom-Camp" with all the inconveniences thereof (There were no bunks and the men had to sleep on the ground).

Supply of food. As far as the food supplied by the Japanese the quantity, quality and change was inadequate during the whole stay at Flores, and the purchase on own initiative (part of the duty-money and officers' salaries) through a centralised bureau lessened the number of diseases and deaths (beri-beri, oedema, pellagra, etc.) The Japanese food supply only consisted of rice (varying from 350 to 500 gr per day), waloer and later on kedelehbeans, while from time to time (in the beginning) small quantities lard sapi- or goats meat and few times a little fish, fruit and green vegetables were distributed. To gather green vegetables (wild krokot i.e. sort of spinach) in the neighbourhood of the camp, only a few convalescents were available.

Duties.

Harbour-duties. Immediately on arrival the "Blom-Camp", FLORES the Ps/W dead tired from the voyage, had to unload the ships for 3 or 4 days and a number of Ps/W were beaten with a stick at the duty roll-call. This harbour-duty-work was repeated several times, when a group of ships anchored at the Macemere roads/ harbour. These duties as a rule lasted a few days with a working-time of 8 hours work - 8 hours rest and in some cases 16 hours work - 8 hours rest, which rest included the walk to and from the harbour, (thus twice 3 km). During these duties part of the workers often, (also in the evening and at night), stood waist deep in the water to pick up the benzine drums and wood that was cast overboard. The Japanese commands were confusing because each Japanese and Korean gave his own commands and orders the men were continuously beaten and urged.

"Karan-duties". To gather karang stones which could be got at low tide in the neighbour of the camp as a rule convalescent sick were used. When the tide was coming in which time they had to stand in the water up to the knees; this had disastrous results for many stomach-patients and malaria cases who were reconvalescent. Although footwear was compulsory, made many work without shoes, which caused many cuts and infection. As result

Aerodrome-duties. The main part of the duties were those on the so-called aerodrome (construction in total of 3 aerodromes); And the work which as a rule took place in mist and dust, consisted amongst other things of removing earth (often 1.5m per person per day) to smooth the field, digging the drainage canals, digging out and canalizing already existing kali's, constructing blastproof shelters for airplanes, digging sand-digging wells etc. As well as of serving a stone-breaker, during which they had to work without a stop in the burning sun, stone-gravel and dust. The working-time incl. rest was about 10 hours (7.15 a.m. to 5 o'clock pm.); later on when there were fatigue-duties the work stopped earlier. It has specially to be mentioned that as a rule people who were declared unfit by our doctors had to join the aerodrome-duties, they were appointed by the guards (especially by the Korean OYAMA who often himself kept the roll-call for the sick). Those who during the work dropped off on account of dysentery, fever or malaria (appr. 8 or 10 per day) were allowed to return to the camp after

lunch

lunch with these who fetched the food at about 2 or 3 p.m. and on arrival in camp they usually were waited for by the camp commandant, beaten and put to work or had to stand to attention until the main group of the workers returned to the camp some hours later.

Clothing and footwear.

Footwear. The footwear the workers had brought with them (partly shoes distributed at Sourabaya) was soon worn out, so that very soon part of the workers had to walk barefooted work (distance of 1½, 5 and 6 km) and had to do their work there. The result was that many (for the greater part infected) wounds were caused.

Clothing. To wear/carry along upperclothing was forbidden workers; pants hung like rags round their bodies as a result of inadequate means of repairing and heavy wear, also through the washing with sea-water (originally without soap). Only after many months a limited amount of graygreen clothing mostly in too small sizes was distributed.

Safety/safe-guarding.

In the camp. Enclosed drawing of the situation (Encl A.) points out the very dangerous location of the camp near the aerodrome. (The end of the main landing strip was at a distance of 75 m from the barracks.)

Even if they wished to spare the adjacent Ps/W camp during a possible bombing, it would be very much endangered. The same counts for a possible machine-gun attack on the adjacent Japanese barracks and those of the Korean guards. That the Japanese also saw this proves the fact that a Japanese sergeant-major AOKI expressed himself in the presence of some Ps/W as above. Protection against airplane attacks was not present in the first months. Later open (parallel to the road and the shore) not very deep trenches were constructed, whilst still later a primitive camouflage was made (leaves upon the barracks); not considering the question whether these precautions ameliorated the safety of the Ps/W or not.

During the fatigue work. Precautions were neglected on the very vulnerable aerodrome work; in case of an Allied attack the order was to try to seek cover as well as possible in the adjacent shrubs. Also during work on the airbase itself there was not enough care taken to safe-guard as appears from the fact that had the Ps/W put dynamite into pits despite the protests of the leader because no precautions were taken and whilst the Japanese themselves looked on from a considerable distance. Also with the harbour duties the risks were still greater (the Japanese airplanes were continually in the air and American planes machinegunned a convoy entering the harbour (mid July 1943) every precautions were lacking. There were no shelters and the order was lately: go on working in case of air alarm and only look for cover when the airplanes appeared, bombing or strafing.

1st & 2nd Sick Camps (so-called "Wulff-camps")

The coconut garden in which, on the 10th of May 1943, the sick and healthy Ps/W from the s.s. "Tasima Maru" and on about 11th May 1943 the sick from s.s. "Tensio Maru" were lodged, remained after the departure (about the 20th May) of the healthy people, exclusively a sick camp (the so-called 1st "Wulff-Camp"); on June 10th this camp was transferred as a whole to a barracks camp (the so-called 2nd "Wulff-camp") which in the meantime had been built in the neighbourhood (about 300 m) and that was liquidated on 9th September 1943, whilst the remainder of the sick were brought to the sick department of the "Blom-camp".

Material Care.

Accommodation. In the "1st Wulff-Camp" there was no accommodation /at

at all, except a kampong house and a store room that were taken by the Korean guards the first day and thereafter used as a dispensary and a store. Hundreds of sick as well as doctors and nurses, lay in the open air on the ground and the only cover was a number of hastily made improvised covers of mosquito nets (partially covered with banana leaves) for the most serious cases. The latter were transferred in 2 cases of heavy rain to an open goat stable; in one of these cases (29th May 1943) 2 men died in the dark whilst they lay there crowded, without bed-pans and making each other dirty. This appeared when daylight came. The transfer on 10th of July 1943 to the "2nd Wulff-camp" (which lasted, for lack of stretchers, from 10.36 a.m. until 10.30 p.m.) made the situation better insofar that part of the patients could be lodged in 2 barracks (accommodating 400 men normally, but now 550 sick); it was constructed the same way as the "Blom-camp" with all the inconveniences thereof (there were no bunks and the men had to sleep on the ground). Appr. 200 men, who had no room in these barracks were: a. serious patients (who could only use the trench latrines and on that account were brought to the barracks); b. most of the convalescent patients; Both groups originally stayed in the open air, but later on each got 3 wood barracks for housing built by latter. The orderlies had to be lodged in a space under the floor of the doctor's house. The kitchen accommodation in both camps was very poor; in the 1st camp there was no accommodation at all and they had to make the best of an improvised kitchen. There was no illumination and if any was very inadequate. Only 5 oil lamps for the whole of the ward of the 2nd Camp were available.

Hygienic precautions. In the "1st Wulff-camp" no bedpans were available. In the ward for serious patients a little hole was dug next to each bed and the patients had to roll over it. Because a stool of 40 to 60 times a day was not an exception, time and again new holes had to be dug round the patient until that was impossible and a new bed had to be found. In case the patient was too weak to roll over to the hole next to their bed one was dug under it, and through the sleeping mat. In the beginning there was no water to wash the patients let alone clean their dirty clothes, and therefore they lay in this ward with uncovered (or slightly covered) under-part of the body, which was dirty from excrement and flies; in many cases bed-sore patients had fist deep wounded filled with mites (In the 2nd Wulff-camp" the discharging system with holes had to go on until finally some bedpans became available and the serious patients could be lodged in the wood barracks. In the ward for less seriously ill people cans could be used which had to be emptied in a dry ditch; later on here also trench latrine were built as in the ward for convalescent patients, in which this system was used, only the convalescent patients had to dump and redig these latrines themselves. In the "2nd Wulff-camp," usually these trenches were deeper (because of the ground water), but the small distance from the ward for lightly ill caused a considerable plague of flies. Lack of bathing and washing opportunity is apparent from the fact that during the first 3 weeks doctors and nursing personnel, only three times had the opportunity to wash themselves with dry water from a well near a kampong house.

Medical care. Not only lack of accommodation and hygienic precautions but also intense shortage of medicines and dressing material

made

made application of medical care very difficult, often even impossible. Here also in the beginning the medicines which the doctors and orderlies possessed, had to be used. The official soatres, taken along from Java, became available only a week after arrival notwithstanding many repeated requests on account of the growing number of serious cases which were likely to die. A somewhat larger supply therefore was at our disposal, but often not the medicines which were most badly needed. Instruments were not available.

Food supplies. The Japanese only supplied rice and waloce. The first week it was prohibited to buy additional food but insufficient guard aided an individual "kawat" commerce, which of course the walking patients got first and made supply to the serious patients difficult. The purchase of pork ameliorated the household a bit. But the supply of milk by the Roman Catholic Mission for the serious patients was forbidden after a few days, while the purchase of other restoratives (eggs, fish, fruit) was very much thwarted and often made impossible because the Korean Guards themselves bought and stole these articles, or they made such a maximum price for our purchase, that the sellers who sympathised and helped us very much, had to return without effect. The meat meant for the sick camp butchered in the "Blom-camp" only arrived a few times. The Korean charged with the intendence usually used this for his own means. On arrival in the "1st Wulff-camp" there was only one well which had to be used for the kitchen; the first day there was no drinking water at all and thereafter for a long time the water was fetched with difficulty from a distant well, resulting in a poor distribution of tea to patients who often through loss of liquid resulting from dysentery were very thirsty and they clandestinely drank coconut milk and so made their troubles worse. Later on there came some improvement in the situation.

Duties.

Nursing. The number of nursing orderlies was so small, that the orderlies had to do too heavy work, had too little rest and as a result of the bad accommodation and food relapsed and became patients.

Other duties. The first 10 days the healthy people staying in the "1st Wulff-camp", who were not incorporated for harbour duty could be used but afterwards convalescents must be used for other duties (with exception of kitchen duty, which must be done by non-patients). Digging of latrines, cleaning of the camp, bearing of water in heavy casks, which when they are empty must be carried by 4 bearers, who must change after 100 M., distributing of food, making graves, bearing and cremation of corpses, must be done by convalescents. The result was that there were daily relapses.

Safety/safety-measures.

The boundary of the "1st Wulff-Camp" was made by a road, a dry gutter, and an imaginary line along some separate bushes. In this way it was very difficult, especially in the evening and at night, to know if you was inside or outside the boundary, so that the POW's were not safe from the guards in case of real or pretended passing the boundary (see case Borman). The Korean guards seldom patrolled around the camp, so that in fact the responsibility was for the Dutch camp command.

Acting of guards.

Japanese Commander and warrant-officer.

Japanese commander.

The Japanese commander of the Flores-camps, Lieutenant ASHITA, was known during

during his residence on Flores (as on the sea voyages) as a person, who never interfered with the direct command of the camps. He lived during the greatest part of his residence there in the village of Macemere, he never came in the camp of sick persons (once he walked through the "2nd Wulff-Camp" with a handkerchief to his nose and mouth) and very seldom in the "Blom-camp" (at the most once a week). Only to the ceremony of bowing at a funeral did he give his attention (unesteemed being too late, so that the cremation could take place in the evening). The only purpose for his visits to the "Blom-Camp" was the dentist and painting, later he gave his attention to the strength of the barbed wire fence of the camp and afterwards made concentration space between the sheds of sick persons, in case of alarm. The Dutch Camp commander was never given the opportunity to speak with him. In the rare cases when you could speak to him he listened absentmindedly and uninterestedly and reacted negatively to each urgent request or proposal by being silent and ending the conversation by walking away without answering. In the first months he had given the direct command, by passing his warrant officers into hands of his Korean confidant, the guard OYAMA, who was responsible for a reign of terror. This reign of terror was ended by the Japanese Sergeant Major not act as "leader" and Japanese warrant officers were appointed to command. We cannot judge if the attitude of the warrant officers SAKEMOTA, HASIKAWA, ISHI, NAKAHARA and the interpreter ASUMA was a result of a lack of help from the Japanese camp commander. Their effort to get action from ASHITA on the illtreatment of Captain De Thoars gives an indication in that direction. But the real fact is that the warrant-officers (with exception of AOKI) never interfered with the daily matters and the behaviour of the Korean guards, so that the impropriety of the Flores-camps was partly a result of their attitude. Sergeant-Major AOKI was the man, who has taken active part in camp affairs, corrected the situation, never beaten anyone, stopped the misdemeanour of the Korean guards, his attitude and measures were human, a great difference with the attitude of the others. For a proper understanding it must be known that the other warrant officers (with exception of the interpreter, ASUMA, who committed many brutalities) did not illtreat the POWs directly. They did not oppose or limit the illtreatment of the guards in contrast with AOKI.

Korean Guards.

With a single exception the Korean guards misbehaved themselves during the whole period on Flores to the POWs. That it became a little bit better during the last months was exclusively the result of the long stay there and not of human feelings. The really unlimited power of the guard commanders, duty leaders, intendants, soldiers of the day and others functionaries were abused by measures, which resulted in illtreatment of the POWs and advantage to themselves. The orders and the control for the lining up and cleaning of dust-bins, the giving of the military salute, the regular and repeated effort at extortion of watches, fountain pens and clutches, the theft/embezzlement of meat and other food for the POWs, the many cases of bad behaviour in the camp as a result of drunkenness and the forcing, under menace, of unmoral acts, also the punishment for real or fancied offences, the slapping (or orders to others to slap) of the face, the hitting of head and body with bamboo, cane or rifle butt, etc. This gave in the camps of sick persons and in the camp of working people (incl. sick department), a nervous uncertainty, the best example for this was the

calling

calling of the name of the new acting guard commandant, which name went through the camp immediately, to give the POWs the opportunity to have time for making preparations for the special "hobby" and the punishment. In general there was no consideration by the Korean guards for the sick persons, no devotion for deaths, no human treatment of the POWs. There can be made an exception for some Japanese and specially for the two Christian-Koreans, who gave a quantity of cigarettes as a present to be divided between the POWs on Christmas night 1943 (as a present).

III treatments.

It is impossible to give all details in this statement. It is possible only to give the worst offenders (with some examples their behaviour) and the names of some other guards. (H) ITO. Korean guard. One of the most terrible, who for preference beat his victims on the head with a rifle butt. 1. He kicked a dying patient in the ward of "serious sick persons" of the "1st Wulff-camp", because he could not give the ordered honours in a standing position. (Witness Lieutenant H.V. de Vries). 2. He beat an ill orderly (officially because he did not come at once to the sheds of ill people, but really for refusing to sell a watch of which he had already stopped the central purchase) and Dr. Wulff, as the responsible physician, with 42 blows with a stem of a coconut leaf, whereby the left side of the body of the latter was bruised from shoulder to knee. 3. He maltreated the Dutch Camp commandant Blom, while he was ill, because he complained of the increasing maltreatments. 4. He maltreated Lt. SOERENS and Dr. EISBACH in the Taliboran camp, broke the arm of POW EEKHOF and beat one of the buyers so severely that he got a rupture of the ear-drum.

CYAMA. Korean guard. About his reign of terror see the aforementioned explanation.

1. He interfered during this period with the sick report and sent malaria and dysentery patients with fever on duty to the aerodrome.
2. He beat sick POWs who returned from their duty and some beri-beri patients with a rifle butt.
3. Serious illtreatment of the Res. 1st Lt. P.W. STEEN (fearpschycosis during following dysentery) which indirectly resulted in death of this person.

4. Very serious illtreatment of the landstorm-sergeant BROUWER and of Lt. HARMSEN (in connection escape of some soldiers of his platoon)

ARAY - Korean guard. This man committed serious maltreatment not only as a leader of the working-party, but also in other cases.

1. In the ward "seriously ill patients" of the "1st WULFF-camp" he kicked a very sick patient on the head, because he did not "lay at attention".
2. Maltreated with a coconut-rib a group of convalescents of the "1st WULFF-camp" (with permission of the guard-commandant) who were looking for medicinal herbs and after that made them kneel in the sun for some hours.
3. Beat up the part of the campstaff of the "2nd WULFF-camp" at that moment available because of an "offence" of no importance (ash tray not wholly clean) and after that punched them in the face for a long time.
4. "Kicked sergeant CHAVANNES in the hospital" (with a kidney injury and a broken arm).

MATSUOKA

MATSUOKA - Korean guard. Of the Korean guards this one was the most horrible type.

1. Summoned all the officers in camp Taliboera to the guardhouse and made them kneel down and kicked and beat them with sticks without any reason at all, only because he did not like the human behaviour of the Japanese camp commandant.
2. In the "1st WULFF-camp" he kicked a sick (later on he died) POW Mr. J. A. MEURSINGE on the leg causing a wound 10 cm. long to the bone because he was late in lying to attention and beat him once again.
3. Tried to induce some young P.O.W.s to commit homosexuality under threats (case van REES).

ASUMA - Japanese interpreter. This man was guilty of brutality several times not only during the voyage to and back, but also during the stay in Flores.

1. Serious maltreatment of Lieutenants HARMSEN and HANGEVEELD.
2. Kicked his shoe to pieces against the head of P.O.W. JOB.

KASHIMURA - Korean guard. Next to some cases of maltreatment he was extremely (CLAUS) keen on making the sick who come back from their duty on the aerodrome stand at attention at the guard house. He beat them up or sent them back again to their work until the working-party as a whole came back.

YAMAMOTO - Korean guard/ leader of working patients. In last mentioned function he was several times guilty to maltreatment, refer to case de Thouars.

MAKIAMA, MASIYAMA, NAKAHARA, KIAMA, YAMASAKI, TAKAMINI and TAMURA

NAMES WHICH must be added to the list to illustrate the we comment on two more cases of illtreatment.

The case of Captain DE THOUARS. As a rule the Capt. of inf. DE THOUARS acted as Dutch duty-commandant during the days of disembarkation at the harbour of Macemere and immediately afterwards. May 13th 1943 he complained to the Jap. sgt. ISHI and sgt. SAKAMOTO of the excessive use of liquor (so called "soopie goengong") by the guards and he expected excesses based on the experiences of the former days. In the afternoon Cpt. DE THOUARS asked for and received permission from the Korean head of the working-party YAMAMOTO to send back by truck to the "Blom-Camp" some dysentery-patients who just had disembarked and some people on duty who fell ill. After a heated argument between YAMAMOTO and the Korean driver before starting the latter hit the Captain in the face, while YAMAMOTO kicked him on the shins screaming "kiotske".

Filled with indignation over this attitude Cpt. DE THOUARS, answered YAMAMOTO's questions as following: that he (DE THOUARS) had fought against the Japs, now he was obliged to obey the orders of the Jap, and that he would again fight against the Japs, if there was a chance. Then he got a total of forty blows with a rifle butt from the Korean MAKIAMA, on the mouth, was hit and pushed about, while in the meantime YAMAMOTO tried all sorts of jiu-jitsu-tricks on him.

Soon after that Sg. SAKAMOTO appeared again on the scene and through him Cpt. DE THOUARS was able to tell the camp commandant his complaint.

YAMAMOTO answered during this very superficial interrogation that that reason of the maltreatment was that Cpt. DE THOUARS without his knowledge sent the sick people of two kinds (disembarking people and duties) in one car, which caused confusion. The result of the illtreatment was a light concussion of the brain, an effusion over the whole body and a serious

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wound of the right eye, causing a permanent injury. In the judgment of the Medical Officer, I Marien, this illtreatment would have caused the death to a less athletic person than Capt. DE THOUARS.
The case of BROUWER.

The 1st sergeant H.A.B. BROUWER, No. 121304, was beaten by OYAMA with a rifle butt, because he did not see OYAMA, who walked outside the shed where BROUWER stayed, when the gedek was $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. high and he did not bow. He was sent to the Japanese guard house to kneel and was beaten again with the rifle butt and was beaten by the rest of the guards for half an hour with bamboos, rifles and the open hand on head and body. BROUWER, who was knocked down with each blow collapsed when he went away to the gate of the camp and had to be carried to the hospital where he was for a week. The result of this illtreatment was as well as many painful spots over the body a terrific blue spot on the left buttock with a middle line of about 30 cm., also a torn eardrum. After his release from the hospital BROUWER stumbled for a long time before he could walk normally.

State of health/Death/Execution/Murder.

State of health.

Number of sick.
 The medical information about the general state of health (the number of sick during the several periods on FLORES). is not available at the moment (they are buried in one of the Java-Camps together with other pieces. Some information could give a sufficient view of this case). The fact is that until the first return transport (27th January 1944) 800 men of the original 2079 men at the most favourable time were able to do their duty outside the camp and at the most unfavourable time not more than 350 men. These figures speak for themselves. The hospital in the "Blom-Camp" after the closing of the "2nd WULFF camp" held continually 1200 patients, except the sick in quarters in the department of healthy people.

The kind of illness. During the first dysentery explosion there was the beginning of beri-beri, whilst afterwards there came a malaria-epidemic, which lasted until practically the end. There were daily many cases pellagra and wound infections. Dysentery had the most victims, while malaria, especially the malaria comatosa, and beri-beri the so-called wet-beri-beri were deadly. Elsewhere there's an explanation of how the plague of flies as a result of the open latrines and the pigsty nearby increased the dysentery cases, whilst the malaria-infection came from the period in the open air and the appearance of a mosquito-swamp in the middle of the "Blom-Camp". Lack of accommodation, hygienical supplies and medicines, also bad food increased the sickness.

Death.

Number of death. Irrespective of the many deaths afterwards, during the voyage 213 POW's died, 2 on the outward voyage, 1 in the train during the return and 208 POW's died at Flores as a result of illness and two were killed by the Japanese. Below is a table giving the death in each age-group.

Age	Number of deaths		Age	Number of deaths	
	Total	In % of total deaths		Total	In % of total deaths
unknown	15	7	35-40	35	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
till 25	20	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	40-45	54	26
25-30	17	8	45-50	35	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
30-35	31	15	50-60	3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$

For the review of the deathrate for a week see the graph (supplement B)

Funerals. The treatment of the corpses of the diseased persons was very bad. First they were laid on the ground under a blanket or a mosquito net, afterwards consent was given to build a mortuary. In the beginning there were coffins, but soon the dead were buried in mosquito nets and blankets and later on in goenisacks. The funerals from the both "Wulff-Camps" took place on a stretcher; from the "Blom-Camp" the corpses were carried away on an open truck together with serious ill persons, who must be brought to the "Wulff-Camp". Later on the funeral took place in a little goods-van, where the attendants must sit on the ground around the coffin and which was driven so fast that it was very difficult to hold the body on their bier. During the first days there came the order to cremate the corpses of the dysentery-patients "on account of affection". This cremation took place in the vault and caused in the beginning some difficulties on account of inexperience (insufficient carbonization) specially when coconut husks must be used in place of wood. After a while they didn't give wood anymore for the crosses, so that 80 graves stayed without indication except a border of old coconuts. After the liquidation of the second Wulff Camp opportunity was only given 3 or 4 times to keep the cemetery in repair. (a coconut garden in the neighbourhood of the 2nd Wulff Camp). A request for hiring an Indonesian to do this, was refused, so that it soon became a wilderness.

Execution/murder.

The case of Visser. Two days after the end of May 1943, when the section commander in charge, of the POW Visser, missed him, news was given that Visser was arrested by some Japanese sailors, who saw him walking --- K.M. east of the Camp. It may be concluded that this POW escaped the Camp, but identification never took place. We learnt from a number of items about trial and execution and from the fact that in those days a shift of Korean guards went off with rifles and shovels, to come back after a short time, and from the fact that the Japanese interpreter ASUMA was seen with Visser's rucksack, that he had been executed. Up to now it is unknown where, in which manner and after which trial this took place.

The case of Borgman. Dr. Wulff, the interpreter Lottgering and the res. 1st Lieutenant H.H.J. de Vries were called by the Korean OYAMA, to the Japanese Camp commander who was in a kampong house in the neighbour (in the presence of an unknown Korean guard) about half an hour after two shots were heard, followed by about half an hour after two shots were heard, followed by shouting, in the 1st Wulff Camp, on the night of the 7th June 1945 at 9 o'clock.

This Camp commander gave the order to identify a shot prisoner of war "trying to escape" but were forbidden to ask questions. The victim who was lying on his back on some distance from the house (a little stream of blood trickled from his mouth) mentioned that he was Borgman. He whispered to Dr. Wulff and Lt. de Vries that his condition was hopeless, a shot through both lungs, so that nothing could help any more. After returning to the Camp commander and making a report about the identification the officers were lead to the Camp, afterwards they heard ASHITA giving an order to an unknown guard. On the way back they heard a 3rd shot, on arrival at the Camp OYAMA gave the order to the section commander of the victim (1st Lieut. Jellema) to go back to the kamponghouse with a stretcher and 6 orderlies (including Costerus and Driessen). They found Borgman dead with a shot through his head.

Funerals. The treatment of the corpses of the diseased persons was very bad. First they were laid on the ground under a blanket or a mosquito net, afterwards consent was given to build a mortuary. In the beginning there were coffins, but soon the dead were buried in mosquito nets and blankets and later on in goenisacks. The funerals from the both "Wulff-Camps" took place on a stretcher; from the "Blom-Camp" the corpses were carried away on an open truck together with serious ill persons, who must be brought to the "Wulff-Camp". Later on the funeral took place in a little goods-van, where the attendants must sit on the ground around the coffin and which was driven so fast that it was very difficult to hold the body on their bier. During the first days there came the order to cremate the corpses of the dysentery-patients "on account of affection". This cremation took place in the vault and caused in the beginning some difficulties on account of inexperience (insufficient carbonization) specially when coconut husks must be used in place of wood. After a while they didn't give wood anymore for the crosses, so that 80 graves stayed without indication except a border of old coconuts. After the liquidation of the second Wulff Camp opportunity was only given 3 or 4 times to keep the cemetery in repair. (a coconut garden in the neighbourhood of the 2nd Wulff Camp). A request for hiring an Indonesian to do this, was refused, so that it soon became a wilderness.

Execution/murder.

The case of Visser. Two days after the end of May 1943, when the section commander in charge, of the POW Visser, missed him, news was given that Visser was arrested by some Japanese sailors, who saw him walking --- K.M. east of the Camp. It may be concluded that this POW escaped the Camp, but identification never took place. We learnt from a number of items about trial and execution and from the fact that in those days a shift of Korean guards went off with rifles and shovels, to come back after a short time, and from the fact that the Japanese interpreter ASUMA was seen with Visser's rucksack, that he had been executed. Up to now it is unknown where, in which manner and after which trial this took place.

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On completion of the order to bring the corpse to the cemetery to cremate it and to close the grave, the orderlies had the opportunity to state that the first shot really riddled the chest and in such a way, that the bullet had to riddle the arms if these were hanging down, (this can point to a "hands up" when this shot was heard) Lt. Jellema was maltreated the following morning in connection with this accident. Dr. Wulff was forced by OYAMA some weeks after this, to sign a death certificate, in which dysentery was mentioned as cause of death. We may be sure that Borgman did not want to escape but tried to buy some food from Indonesians, (so as many others tried) and in this case passed the boundary, the dry riverbed, see under head "1st and 2nd camp for sick people, the so-called "Wulff Camp", sub safety/protection measures) seduced by the absence of barbed wire and the slight patrolling along this part of the camp.

IV. Return Voyage MACEMERE (FIORUS) - BATAVIA.

Transport of sick people (27-1-'44 and 10-5-'44)

Embarkation in MACEMERE.

The 1st transport of sick, which consisted patients could take with them the contents of a square military rucksack, not overpacked and without anything tied on, so that most of the patients had to leave behind a big part of their tattered belongings permission was refused for any of them to take with them their uniform, except the clutches they were wearing, whilst only officers were allowed shoes. Despite the provision of transport the distance "Blom-Camp" - Macemere had to be done on foot with luggage (3 K.M.), while during the March more military trucks passed them, in which the men, who fell out even were not allowed. From 10 O'clock in the morning till 5 P.M. this group must wait for embarkation in a back garden of an Indonesians house in the village of Macemere. Most of the sick people (i.e. serious beri-beri patients) must climb the rope ladder with their rucksack at the embarkation while there was a companion way. The barges alongside the ship were subject to heavy swell, so that it was impossible for many of them to get to the rope-ladder in time.

Voyage Macemere - Sourabaya. The accommodation was insufficient at both sick transports. On the 1st draft the available space between decks of hatch 1 (dirty from cement) and of hatch two gave insufficient room for lying; stretched out, staying on deck was forbidden except for visiting the lavatory. The food distribution was also in the holds. There was no bath and wash-place, water was only allowed for washing up. Hanging baskets outside the ship were used as latrine for one person. Although it was insufficient in quantity and quality the food was better then on the outward voyage. Food was prepared in the Japanese kitchen. The distribution of drinking water was limited. The light was very bad. In the 2nd sick draft there was not enough room for isolation of infectopus patients. There was lying a patient with open t.b.c. and a patient with crysipelas between the other patients.

Arrival in Batavia. After a voyage of 5 days in the hold and a train journey of 64 hours (normal 12 hours) in overcrowded 4th class wagons the 1st sick draft was left on arrival at Adek-Camp Batavia at night 11 o'clock, for hours in the mud and the rain, in an open field and must undergo a search.

/ After

After this at 3 o'clock in the night they were lay asleep in an empty shed and were chased out the building at 7.30 in the morning to line up for "morning roll-call".

Deaths. One of the patients of the 1st sick draft died during the train journey Sourabaya-Bandoeng-Batavia in the pneumonia ward. It was possible to bury him in Bandoeng, but the corpse had to be carried on the platform to Batavia.

MORE RETURN TRANSPORT.

Material care. The accommodation at the 3rd, 4th and 5th return-transport were in general also insufficient; not enough room practically no bath or wash place, defective hygienic arrangements (hanging latrines outside the ship) and insufficient life-belts. It deserved a special mention, that the POW's (479) in the 3rd return transport had to sit down the whole first night on the unprotected foredeck. The following day a part got a place in a midship bunker, where the men must lie, packed like sardines in dust, coal-dust, in unbearable heat from the adjacent boilers, insufficient ventilation and light.

15 drums filled with petrol were on deck the 5th return transport from Macemere until Bima was reached.

Guards. On the 3rd return transport the Japanese interpreter ASUMA owing to the selling of goods to the ships crew, severely illtreated the victims, together with the two responsible section commandants (the 1st Lt. de Roo and the 2nd Lt. v. d. Eyck.) He beat them with a heavy wooden clog on the face and head helped by the Korean guard MATSUMOTO. Next he punished those caught smoking too early, together with their section Commandant 1st Lt. Harders, by kneeling about twenty minutes with the knees on the sharp corner of the steps of a ladder. The same ASUMA illtreated the 1st Lt. de Boer twice during the train trip Sourabaya-Batavia. (severe beating with a stone, which was taken from the sleeper and dragging him all over one of the stations) owing to pretended "mistake" in the distributing of tea and the closing of the windows. During the same journey the Korean TAKAMINI illtreated the POW van Mourik, because he asked his stolen grease tin back. In the 4th return-transport the Korean guard MATSIAMA kicked POW Felix Jr. for a minor reason and hit the ensigns de Mey and Remmers very severely in the face.

↑ WS. Capt. A.C.J. de Thouars
 Ldst. soldier C. K. Bra
 res. 1st Lt. H.H.J. de Vries

Manggalaan 47.

BANDOENG.

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Manggalaan 47.

BANDOENG.

5578-1

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物質的 手當

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/737d4b/>

ザリキ、屋根ハ 警舎内ニ掃子箒ノ立在スル爲メ防水ニハ廻メテ送キモノアリ而シテ道路ニ近キ該警舎ハ手車ニ依リテ生ズル塵埃ニ苦シメラレ該塵埃ハ飛行場ノ飛行機ニ依リ更ラニ悪化セラレタリ、樋ノ 候如（該樋ハ後日作ラレタリ）ハ警舎内ニ雨水ヲ流入セシメタリ。収容所又ハ病院ヲ改善スル爲メニ勞務者ヲ少シモ利用出来ナカツタ事實ニ特ニ注意ヲ喚起セザル可カラズ。夜間ハ消燈信號（八時三十分）ニ至ルマデ油ヲ使用スル一箇ノ小サナラムブガ唯一ノ燈火ナリキ、

衛生上ノ予防、一ツノ看護室トシテ最初ノ警通間ハ掃子箒ノ屋根ヲ以テ仕功ラレタル部分ガ使用セラレ事實上此ノ「病者ノ間」ハ重症患者収容所（第一ウルフ収容所）へ移送スルコトニ依リ時々一掃セラレタリ然レドモ遂ニ病人収容ノ警舎ハ量儀ニ準備セラレタリ之等ノ小屋ノ不便（勞務者ノ小屋ト同ジ様ニ構築セラレタルモノ）ハ更ラニ一層（非常ニ劣悪ニシテ）舞台ノ不足ヲ示シ而シテ醫師及ビ病院事務員カラ手當ヲ受ケルノニ座ハラザルヲ得ザル事ヲ以テ特ニ醫師スクーレルガ所屬醫師ノ家（該家中ニ醫療部員ハ宿泊セリ）ノ床下ニ於テコロシタノ蟲様至炎症患若手術ノ要アリシ事ヲ以テ証明セラレタリ。屋根ヨリ落下スル塵埃ハ毛布ヲ承ケトメラレタリ藥品ハ不

充分ニ支給セラレタリ、新クシテ例ヘバ多クノ刻シ
キマラリヤ傳染期間中數週間ニ亘リキニ一ネノ使用
シ得ザルコト屢々起リ、而シテ四十度以上ノ熱病患
者ニ對シテノミ丸藥ハ支給シ得ラレタリ此ノ事ハキ
ニ一ネ劑ノ飲如ガ必ズ死ヲ招來スル昏睡性マラリヤ
ガソノ結果トシテ生ズルニ至リシ時判然リタリキ、
唯僅少ナル發溫器ガ使用出來赤痢及ビ其ノ他ノ胃病
ニ對シテハイキリス鹽ガ使用セラレタリ、藥品ハ極
メテ重難ナル場合ニ於テノミ醫師及ビ病院事務員ノ
所持スルモノヨリ分配セラレタリ。ソレニ對スル藥
品ガ不十丈ナリシ脚氣及其他ノ病氣ニツイテモ同様
ナリキ、同收容所ニ於テ管テ充分ナル手當用品ノ使
用セラレタルコト殆ンド無シ。

酵母、カテレミルク、ジヨハール業ノ抽劑、ベータ
ーヘーディング外處及ビ芝ニ類スル物ニヨリ藥品ノ
不足ヲ補ハザルベカラザリキ元氣回復劑ノ分配ハ同
題外ナリキ唯一ノ能ク爲シ得タル事ハ陸々少量ニ提
供セラレ且ツ常ニ朝鮮人衛兵ニ依リ請求セラレタル
鵝卵ヲ贈フコトナリキ。

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勞働ノ時間ハ休息ヲ含メテ約十時間（午前七時十五
分ヨリ午後五時ニ至リ）ナリキ。後ニ至リ疲勞スル
勞務ノ有リタル場合ハ之レヨリモ早ク勞働ヲ中止ス

ルコトトナレリ原則トシテ我々ノ醫館ニ依リ不適當ナリト宣セラレタル者ガ飛行場勤務ニ参加セザル可カラザリシコトハ特ニ取リ立テ言及セザル可カラズ
 彼等ノ即チ飛行場勤務ノ者ノハ衛兵ニ依リテ任命セラレタリ（殊ニ朝鮮人大山ニ依リ任命セラレタリ同人ハ屢々自ラ病人ニ對スル詰呼ヲ行レタリハ熱病中赤痢熱病ハマラリヤ（一日約八人乃至十人ハノ爲メニ差伍スル者ハ約午後ノ二時又ハ三時ニ食物ヲ携ヘ來ル者ト共ニ昼食後收容所ヘ歸ルヲ許サレ收容所ヘ到着ノ上彼等ハ常ニ疲レ果テ收容所司令官ニ依リ待テウケ鞭打セラレ幾時間カノ後勤務者ノ本隊ガ俘虜收容所ヘ歸勤務ニ服セシメラレルカ若クハ「氣ヲ附」ノ姿勢ニテ立タザル可カラズ

被服及ビ履物、

履物、勞役者ガ目ヲ持參シ來レル履物（一部ハスベラヤニ於テ分配セラレタル靴）ハ何時ニシテ履脱セル爲メ極メテ何時ニシテ一部ノ勞役者ハ裸足ニテ仕事ニ歩行スルヲ要シ（一軒半、五、六軒ノ距離而シテ其所ニ於テ彼等ノ仕事ヲ爲サザル可カラズ其ノ結果ハ多クノ負傷者ヲ生ゼシメタルコトナリ（大部ハ病母ヲ含ミタルモノナリ）

被服、上衣ヲ着用シ又ハ携帯スルコトハ勞役者ニ對シ禁ゼラレタリ、ズボンハ不充分ナ修繕手段ト被シ

5578-5

キ着用ノ結果トシテ且ツ又海水ヲ以テスル汚濁ヲ
シテ彼等ノ身体ノ周邊ニ儘横ノ如ク垂レ下レリ（初
カラ石鹼無シ一多クノ月日ヲ經タ後始メテ多クハ小
型ニ失スル灰綠色ノ被服ノ僅少ナル數量ガ分配セラ
レタノミナリ

安全又ハ保護

收容所ニ於ケル位置ヲ示セル封入セル圖面（同封込）
ハ飛行場ニ近キ收容所ノ極メテ危険ナル位置ヲ指摘
ス（主タル滑走路ノ絶端ハ營舎ヨリ七十五米突ノ距
離ニ在リ）有リ得可キ爆撃中ソレニ隣接セル俘虜收
容所ヲ彼等ガ助ケ様ト欲シタトシテモソノ收容所ハ
尙且ツ非常ナル危険ニ曝サレシナラン

同様ノ事が隣接セル日本人營舎及ビ朝鮮衛兵ノ營舎
ニ對スル有リ得ベキ機銃掃射ニツイテモ言ヒ得ル。
日本人モ亦此ノ事ヲ知り居タルコト日本ノ青木專長ガ自ラ
或ル俘虜ノ面前ニ前述ノ如ク語リタル事實ガ證明ス
ル所ナリ。飛行機ノ襲撃ニ對スル保護ハ最初ノ數月
間ハ存在セズ後月（道路及ビ海岸ニ並行シテ）覆無
ク餘リ深カラザル壕ノ構築セラレルト共ニ更ラニ後
日ニ至リ原始的ナル迷彩ガ施サレタリ（即チ木ノ葉
ヲ營舎上ニ載ス）而シテ之等ノ豫防手段ガ俘虜ノ安
全ヲ改善スルヤ否ヤノ問題ヲ考慮スルコト無シ

勞務中、豫防手段ハ飛行場ノ作業ニ於テ開始セラレ

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勞務中、豫防手段ハ飛行場ノ作業ニ於テ開始セラレ

5578-6

タリ聯合軍艦來ノ場合ニハ命令ハ近クノ港内林口ニ
出來ル丈ケヨク隠レ場所ヲ捜シ求ムル機試ミル様ニ
トノコトナリキ、何等ノ警戒無キ爲メ指續者ノ反對
ニ抱ハラズ停房ラシテ坑中ニダイナマイトヲ埋填セ
シメ其ノ間日本人目体ハ相當ノ距離ヨリ修習シ居タ
ル事實ニ徴シテ明ラカナル如ク飛行場自來ノ作業中
ニ於テモ亦保護ノ爲メニ充分ナル注意ノ拂ハレタル
コト無カリキ

又派止場勞役ニツイテモ其ノ危險莫ラニ大ニシテ、
即チ日本飛行機ハ絶ヘズ空中ニ在リ而シテ米機ハ入
港ノ發送船ヲ機銃掃射セリ、（千九百四十三年七月
中旬）有ラニル警戒手段ガ缺如ノ状態ナリキ、何等
ノ避難所無ク命令ハ最初次ノ如クニテアリキ、即チ
『空襲警報ノ場合勞務ヲ繼續シテ行ヘ而シテ陸敵機
出現爆撃ノ場合ニノミ隠シ場所ヲ捜シ求メヨ』ト言
フニ在リキ

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5578-6

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『空襲警報ノ場合勞務ヲ繼續シテ行ヘ而シテ唯敵機
出現爆撃ノ場合ニノミ隠シ場所ヲ捜シ求メヨ』ト言
フニ在リキ

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5578-7

千九百四十三年七月十日ノ第二ウルフ收容所ヘノ
移轉（擔架ヲ俟タ爲メ午前十時三十六分ヨリ午後十
時半マデ繼續セリ）ハソノ大部分ノ患者ガ二個ノ假
屋ニ宿泊セシメラレ待タ限度ニ於テ改善セラレタリ。

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/737d4b/>

5578-7

千九百四十三年七月十日ノ第二ウルフ收容所ヘノ
移轉（擔架ヲ缺ク爲メ午前十時三十六分ヨリ午後十
時半マデ繼續セリ）ハソノ大部分ノ患者ガ二個ノ假
屋ニ宿泊セシメラレ得タ限度ニ於テ改善セラレタリ。

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/737d4b/>

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(イ) 重患患者 (之等ノ者ハ唯湯式共同便所ヲ使用シテ
ル爲メ該假屋ヘ移サレタルモノ)

(ロ) 回復期ニ在ル患者ノ大部分ナリ

右兩圖ノ者ハ初メハ露天ニ留マリシモ後日雙方共後
者ニ依リ建テラレタル宿泊用ノ参個ノ木造假屋ヲ得
タリ。病院事務員ハ醫師家屋ノ床下ニ在ル空キ間ニ
宿泊セザルヲ得ザリキ。兩收容所ニ於ケル炊事場設
備ハ極メテ貧弱ニシテ第一收容所ニハ何等其ノ設備
無ク彼等ハ即席炊事場ヲ最善ニ活用セザル可カラザ
リキ。其所ニハ何等ノ燈火無ク又有リトスルモ極メ
不充分ナルモノナリ。唯第二收容所ノ病室ノ全体ニ
對シ五個ノ油ランプヲ使用シ得タルノミナリ。

衛生上ノ豫防手段。第一ウルフ收容所ニ於テハ何
等便器ハ使用セシメラレザリキ。重患患者ニ對スル
病室ニハ小ナル穴ガ各寢台ニ接續シテ掘ラレ、患者ハ
其ノ穴ヲ越エテ轉身セザル可カラズ、一日四十回乃
至六十回ノ便通ハ普通ナルガ故ニ屢々新ラシキ穴ガ
患者ノ周邊ニ掘ラレザル可カラザリシタメ遂ニハ掘
ルコト不可能トナリ新ラシキ寢床ヲ見出サザルベカ
ラザリキ。患者ガ彼等ノ寢台ニ接續スル穴ニ轉ガリ
行クニ力弱キ場合ハ其穴ハ寢台ノ下ニ且ツ睡眠スル
蓆ヲ通シテ掘ラレタリ。當初其所ニハ彼等ノ汚レ
タル衣服ヲ洗フ水ハ勿論、患者ヲ洗フベキ水モ無ク
、夫レガ爲メ彼等ハ此ノ病室内ニ於テ排泄物ト糞ト

ニ依リ不潔ナル身体ノ下方部ニ有筆墨ヲ可キモノ集
クシテ横臥セリ。(或ハ少シク寝ヘルモノモアリ)
多クノ場合床擦レノ患者ハ虱デ充満セル拳ノ深サノ
傷ヲ持チ居リタリ。第二ウルフ收容所ニ於テハ穴ヲ
以テスル排泄方法ハ最後ニ若干ノ便器使用セシメラ
レ、重患患者ガ木造ノ假屋ニ宿泊セシメラレ得ルニ
至ルマデ續行ノ要アリタリ。サマデ重患患者ニ非ザ
ル者ニ對スル病室ニ於テハ體ノ使用許サレ、該體ハ
乾燥セル溝中ニ中味ヲ放出シテ空虛ニセザル可カラ
ズ。後日此處ニモ亦同復期ニ於ケル患者ノ病室ニ於
ケルガ如ク溝樋式共同便所ガ設ケラレタリ。該同復
期患者ノ病室内ニ此ノ方法(溝樋式共同便所)ガ用
ヒラレタルモノナルガ、唯同復期ノ患者ハ自ラ之等
ノ共同便所ヲ塵芥ヲ投ゲ捨テ、埋メ且ツ掃リ去ラザル可
カラザリキ。第二ウルフ收容所ニ於テハ一般ニ夫等
ノ溝ハ他ニ比シテ深カリキ(地水ノ爲メ)然レ共輕
患患者ニ對スル病室ヨリ近距離ニ在ル爲メ相當蠅蚋ヲ
發生セシメタリ。入浴及ビ洗濯ノ機會ニ乏シキコト
ハ最初ノ三週間中醫師及ビ看護ノ職員ガ唯值カニ
參同、馬來式構内家屋ニ近キ湧水セザル井戸ノ溜水
ヲ以テ彼等自身ヲ洗フ機會有リタルニ過ギザル事實
ニ徴シ明白ナリ。

醫療手當。宿舍設備及ビ衛生上ノ豫防手段ノ缺除
ノミナラズ、亦藥品及ビ手當用品ノ著シキ不足ガ醫

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ニ依リ不潔ナル身体ノ下方部ニ何等モ汚キモノ集
クシテ横臥セリ。(或ハ少シク寝ヘルモノモアリ)
多クノ場合床擦レノ患者ハ虱デ充満セル拳ノ深サノ
傷ヲ持チ居リタリ。第二ウルフ收容所ニ於テハ穴ヲ
以テスル排泄方法ハ最後ニ若干ノ便器使用セシメラ
レ、重患患者ガ木造ノ假屋ニ宿泊セシメラレ得ルニ
至ルマデ續行ノ畏アリタリ。サマデ重患患者ニ非ザ
ル者ニ對スル病室ニ於テハ體ノ使用許サレ、該體ハ
乾燥セル溝中ニ中味ヲ放出シテ空虛ニセザル可カラ
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カラザリキ。第二ウルフ收容所ニ於テハ一畝ニ夫等
ノ溝ハ他ニ比シテ深カリキ(地水ノ爲メ)然レ共輕
患患者ニ對スル病室ヨリ近距離ニ在ル爲メ相當蠅孺ヲ
發生セシメタリ。入浴及ビ洗濯ノ機會ニ乏シキコト
ハ最初ノ三週間中醫師及ビ看護ノ職員ガ唯僅カニ
參同、馬來式構内家屋ニ近キ湧水セザル井戸ノ溜水
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醫療手當。宿舍設備及ビ衛生上ノ豫防手段ノ缺除
ノミナラズ、亦藥品及ビ手當用品ノ著シキ不足ガ醫

療手當ノ實施ヲ極メテ困難ナラシメ屢々不可能ニサ
ヘ立チ到ラシメタリ。此所ニ於テモ亦當初醫師及ビ
病院事務員ノ所有セル藥品ガ使用セラレザル可カラ
ザリキ。シヤバヨリ持チ來ラレタル官用品ハ死ニ瀕
セル重態患者ノ増加ノ爲メ幾多ノ反復セル要求アリ
タルニ拘ハラズ、到着後一週間後初メテ使用シ得ル
ニ至レリ。其ノタメ幾ラカ多量ノ供給品ヲ我々ニ於
テ處分シ得ルニ至リタルモ、ソレハ屢々最モ切實ニ
必要トセラレタル藥品ニテハ非ザリキ。醫療用具ハ
得ラレザリキ。

食料供給。日本人ハ唯米及ビ南瓜ノミヲ供給シタ
リ。最初ノ週間、追加食糧ノ購入禁ゼラレタルモ、
衛兵不充分ニシテ、取締リ行キ届カズ、爲メニ個人
ノ營舎ノ鐵網垣根越シノ取引ヲ助ケタリ。其ノ取引
ハ勿論歩行シ得ル患者ニ先取セラレ、重態患者ニ對
スル供給ヲ困難ナラシメタリ。然レドモローマンカ
ソリツク傳道會ニ依ル重態患者ニ對スル牛乳ノ供給
ハ數日ノ後禁ゼラレルト共に他ノ元氣回復資材（鳥
卵、魚肉、果實）ノ購入モ非常ニ妨害セラレ屢々不
可能ニヤシメラレタリ。何故トナレバ、朝鮮人衛兵
自ラ之等ノ物品ヲ買ヒ、且ツ賣ミ、或ハ我々ノ購入
ニ對シ一種ノ最高價格ヲ設ケシタメ、非常ニ我々ニ
同情シ我々ヲ助ケタル賣手が、其ノ甲斐モナク賣ラ
ズニ歸ヘルコトヲ餘儀ナクヤシメラルガ爲メナリ。

療手當ノ實施ヲ極メテ困難ナラシメ屢々不可能ニサ
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テ處分シ得ルニ至リタルモ、ソレハ屢々最モ切實ニ
必要トセラレタル藥品ニテハ非ザリキ。醫療用具ハ
得ラレザリキ。

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ニ對シ一種ノ最高價格ヲ設ケシタメ、非常ニ我々ニ
同情シ我々ヲ助ケタル賣手ガ、其ノ甲斐モナク賣ラ
ズニ歸ヘルコトヲ餘儀ナクセシメラルガ爲メナリ。

ブロム收容所ニ於テ屠殺セラレシ病人收容所ノ爲メノ生肉ハ唯數圓到邇セシニ通ギズ。其ノ管理ノ任ヲ課セラレタル鮮人衛兵ガ、通常ニ彼自身ノ爲メニ之レヲ使用シタリ。第一ウルフ收容所ニ到着スレバ其所ニ唯一ツノ井戸アリ、炊事場ノ爲メニ使用セシメラレタリ。最初ノ日ハ何等飲料水ナク其後モ長時日ニ亘リ水ヲ遠隔ノ井戸ヨリ困難ヲ冒シテ搬ビ來レリ。ソノ結果トシテ赤痢ニ依ル水分喪失ノタメ非常ニ咽喉ノ渴ケル患者ニ對スル茶ノ乏シキ配分トナリ爲メニ彼等ハ秘カニココアナツトミルクラ飲ミ、彼等ノ病氣ヲ惡化セシメタリ。其後若干事態ノ改善ヲ見タリ。

義務

看護。看護吏員ノ數ハ非常ニ僅少ニシテ、夫レガ爲メ病院ノ事務員ハ過激ノ勞務ニ服シ、過少ノ休息ヲ取ルコトヲ餘儀ナクセラレ、而シテ劣悪ノ宿舍設備ト食料ノ爲メ病氣ヲ再度發シテ患者トナレリ。

他ノ勞役。最初ノ十日間ハ波止場勞務ニ組ミ入レラレザリシ第一ウルフ收容所ニ逗留セル健康者ヲ之レニ使用シ得タルモ其ノ後ハ回復期ノ患者ヲ他ノ勞務ノ爲メ使用セザルヲ得ザリキ。(患者ニ非ザル者ニ依リテ爲サル可キ炊事場ノ勞務ヲ除ク) 共同便所ヲ堀ルコト、收容所ノ掃除、重キ^テ樽ノ水ヲ搬ブコト、(其ノ樽ハ空虛ナル時四人ノ擔ギ人ニ依リ搬ブヲ要

ブロム收容所ニ於テ屠殺セラレシ病人收容所ノ爲メノ生肉ハ陸軍隊員運送セシニ過ギズ。其ノ管理ノ任ヲ課セラレタル鮮人衛兵ガ、通常ニ彼自身ノ爲メニ之レヲ使用シタリ。第一ウルフ收容所ニ到着スレバ其所ニ唯一ツノ井戸アリ、炊事場ノ爲メニ使用セシメラレタリ。最初ノ日ハ何等飲料水ナク其後モ長時日ニ亘リ水ヲ遠隔ノ井戸ヨリ困難ヲ冒シテ搬ビ來レリ。ソノ結果トシテ赤痢ニ依ル水分喪失ノタメ非常ニ咽喉ノ渴ケル患者ニ對スル茶ノ乏シキ配分トナリ爲メニ彼等ハ秘カニココアナツトミルクヲ飲ミ、彼等ノ病氣ヲ惡化セシメタリ。其後若干事態ノ改善ヲ見タリ。

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シ、夫集ノ人々ハ百米突ノ從交代ヲ要ス。食料ノ分
配、墓ヲ造ルコト、死体ノ運搬及ビ火葬ハ、回復期
ノ患者ニ依リテ爲サザル可カラズ。其ノ結果ハ毎日
再發患者ノ有リタルコトナリ。

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日本人指導官

フロレス收容所ノ日本人指揮官芦田中尉ハ、彼ノ
フロレス滞在中其ノ收容所ノ直接ノ指揮ニ決シテ容
赦セザリシ人（航海ニ於ケルガ如ク）トシテ周知ノ
人物ナリキ。彼ハ彼ノ滞在中ノ大部分ヲマオエメレ
村ニ居住シ、彼ハ曾テ患者收容所ヘ來リタルコトナ
シ（一同彼ハ彼ノ鼻ト口ニ手巾ヲ當テ第二ウルフ收
容所ヲ通過シタルコトアリ）而シテ極メテ稀ニブロ
ム收容所ニ來レリ。（多クトモ一週ニ一度ナリ）

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

最初ノ月ニ於テ彼ハ彼ノ準士官ヲ、彼ノ信任スル朝鮮人衛兵大山ノ手ニ委ヌルコトニ依リ直接ノ指揮ヲ與ヘタリ。該大山ハ例ノ悉節ノ統治ニ對シ責任者ナリ。

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朝鮮人衛兵。

唯一人ノ例外ヲ除イテハ、朝鮮人衛兵ハフロレス
ニ於ケル全期間中停處ニ對シ非行ヲナシタリ。終リ
ノ數ケ月間ニ稍良クナリタルハ、專ラ其所ニ長ク滞

在セル結果ニシテ人情ノ結果ニ非ズ、衛兵ノ指揮官、
 服務指揮者、監督官、當番兵、及ビ其ノ他ノ職員ノ
 眞ニ無制限ナル權力ハ種々ノ手段ニ依リテ濫用セラ
 レ、俘虜ノ處待ト彼等自身ノ利益ニ終レリ。

整列ニ對スル命令及ビ指揮、芥箱ノ清掃、軍隊敬
 禮ヲ爲スコト、懷中時計、万年筆、衣服ノ強請ニツ
 イテノ定例ノ反復セル努力、俘虜ノ爲メノ肉及ビ其
 他ノ食料ヲ盜ミ取り又ハ着服スルコト、泥酔ノ結果
 トシテノ收容所ニ於ケル數多ノ惡シキ振舞及ビ恐迫
 ノ下ニスル不道德行爲ノ強行、又眞正ノ罪若シクハ
 想像ノ罪ニ對スル處罰、顔面ノ平手打、（又ハ平手
 打ヲ爲サシムル爲メノ他ニ對スル指圖、竹、杖、又
 ハ銃ノ台尻ヲ以テ頭部及ビ身体ヲ打ツコト等ノ行爲
 ハ患者收容所及ビ勞役者ノ收容所（患者ノ部門ヲ含
 ム）ニ於テ神經不安ヲ起サシメタリ。此ノ最癪ノ例
 ハ新任ノ衛兵指揮官代理ノ名ヲ呼ブコトナリ。即チ
 其ノ名ハ、特別ノ道樂及ビ罰ニ對シ準備スル爲メノ
 時間ヲ有ラシムル機會ヲ俘虜ニ與ヘムガ爲メ、直チ
 ニ收容所内ニ傳ヘラレタリ。名ヲ呼ビ廻ハリテ準
 備ヲ爲サシム、一體ニ朝鮮人衛兵ハ病人ニ對シテ何
 等考慮ヲ與フルコトナク、死者ニ對シテモ禮拜スル
 コト無ク、俘虜ニ對シ人情味アル取扱ヲナスコトモ
 無カリシナリ。若干ノ日本人ニツイテ除外例ヲ設ケ
 ルコトヲ得、殊ニ二名ノ耶蘇教信者ノ朝鮮人ニ對シ
 テ然リ。即チ此ノ朝鮮人ハ千九百四十三年クリスマ
 スノ夜、俘虜ノ間ニ分配セラル可キ贈物トシテ若干
 ノ卷煙草ヲ與ヘタリ。

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二 彼ハ病メル一病院事務員（公式ニハ彼ガ即時患者
ノ小屋ニ來ラザルヲ理由トシテ殴打セルモ實際ハ
彼ガ己ニ公買ヲ停止セル懷中時計ノ賣却ヲ拒否セ
ルニ依ル）及ビ責任有ル醫師トシテウルフ醫師ヲ
椰子樹葉ノ鞭ヲ以テ四十二打ノ殴打ヲ爲セリ夫レ
ガ爲後者ノ身体ノ左側ハ肩ヨリ膝ニ掛ケテ打撲傷
ヲ負ハサレタリ

四 彼ハタリボラン收容所ニ於テソールレンス中尉及ビ
 エイスバツチ醫師ヲ虐待シ辱罵イーコフノ腕ヲ折
 リ。。。一方ノ耳ヲ烈シク打テ夫レガ爲メ彼ハ鼓膜
 ラ破ラレタリ

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- 一 彼ハ此ノ期間中患者報告ニ干渉セリ而シテ鬱熱ノ
マラリヤ及ビ赤痢患者ヲ飛行場勞役ニ送リタリ
- ニ 彼ハ彼等ノ勞役ヨリ歸リタル病メル俘虜及ビ若干
ノ勇氣患者ヲ銃ノ台尻ヲ以テ毆打セリ
- 三 豪僧中尉ビ・ダブリニー・ステイーン（赤痢ヨ
リ來ル一種ノ重態患者）ニ對スル極度ノ虐待夫レ
ハ此ノ人物ノ死亡ニ間接ノ原因ヲ爲セリ
- 四 國民軍軍曹ブラウアー及ビホームセン中尉ニ對ス
ル極メテ嚴烈ナル虐待（彼ノ組ニ屬スル若干兵卒
逃亡ニ關シテ）
- 荒井、朝鮮人衛兵、此ノ人物ハ勞役團ノ指揮者トシ
テノミナラズ他ノ場合ニ於テモ嚴シキ虐待ヲ行ヒタ
リ
- 一 第一ウルフ收容所ノ重態患者ノ病室ニ於テ彼ハ氣
ヲ附ケノ横臥姿勢ヲ爲サザリシ故ヲ以テ重態患者
ノ頸部ヲ蹴リタリ
- ニ 藥草ヲ深求中ノ第一ウルフ收容所ノ回復期ニ在ル
一團ノ患者ヲ椰子葉防ヲ以テ折檻シタリ
（衛兵指揮官ノ許可ヲ得テ）而シテ其ノ後テ彼等
ヲシテ日向ニ數時間露ヅカシメタリ
- 三 緊要ナラザル非行（灰皿ハ完全ニ清掃セラレズ）
ノ故ニソノ時居合ハシタ第二ウルフ收容所ノ收容

5578-16

所員ヲ殴打シタリ而シテ其ノ後長時ニ亘リ彼等ノ
頭部ヲ殴打セリ

四 腎臓傷害ト折腕ノ傷害ノ爲入院中ノキアベニース
軍曹ヲ蹴リタリ

松岡、朝鮮人衛兵、朝鮮人衛兵ノ内此ノ人物ハ最モ
恐ル可キ典型ノモノナリキ

一 唯日本ノ收容所指揮官ノ暴動ガ氣ニ陰ハザル爲ニ
ヤツ當リシテタリボエラ收容所ニ於ケル全部ノ
士官ノ俘虜ノ士官ヲ衛舎ニ呼ビ出シ何等ノ理由無
シニ彼等ヲ藤マヅカシメテ蹴リ且棒ヲ以テ彼等ヲ
殴打セリ

ニ 彼ハ第一ウルフ收容所ニ於テ氣ヲ附ケノ横臥姿勢
ヲ取ルニ後レタル爲一患者（後日彼ハ死亡シタリ）
俘虜ジエー・エー・マーシンドノ頭部ヲ蹴リ長サ
十センチ骨ニ達スル傷ヲ生ゼシメ更ニ再ビ壹回彼
ヲ殴打セリ

三 脅迫ノ下ニ或ル若年ノ俘虜ヲシテ鶏姦ヲ爲サシム
ル様説得セムト試ミタリ（ザアンリース事件）

吾妻、日本人通譯、此ノ人物ハ唯往復ノ航海中ニ於
テノミナラズ、フロレンスニ滞在中ニ於テモ數回殘
忍ナル行爲ニ就テ有罪ナリ

一 ハームセン中尉及ビハンデザエルド中尉ヲ辱シク
虐待セルコト

5578-17

ニ辱意ジヨブノ頭部ヲ彼ノ靴ガ寸斷サレルマデ歐リ
タリ

櫻村、朝鮮人衛兵、事件ノ虐待（クラウス）ニ次イ
テ彼ハ暴行場ニ於ケル彼等ノ勞役ヨリ歸還スル患者
ヲ衛舎ニ氣ヲ附ケノ姿勢ニテ立タシムルニ極メテ峻
烈ナリキ、彼ハ彼等ヲ毆打シ若シクハ勞役團ノ全員
ガ歸還スルマデ彼等ノ勞役ニ再ビ彼等ヲ送り返シタ
リ

山本、朝鮮人衛兵、兼勞役患者ノ指導者

前掲終リニ擧ゲラレタル職務ニ於テ彼ハ數回虐待ニ
關シ有罪ナリ

デ・ツリアース事件参照ノコト

デ・ツリアース大尉事件。一般ニ歩兵大尉デ・ツリ
アースハマオエメレノマオエマーノ港ニ於ケル陸揚
ゲノ期間中及ビ其ノ直後ニ於テ和蘭人勞役指揮者ト
シテ活動セリ、千九百四十三年五月十三日彼ハ日本
人軍曹石井及ビ軍曹坂本ニ對シ衛兵ニ依ル淫褻所謂
ソビーゴエノエングノ過度ノ使用ニ就テ不満ヲ述べ
且彼ハ前日ノ經驗ニ基キ餘分ノヲ期待シタリ、午後
ニ此テデ・ツリアース大尉ハ願ヒ出デテ朝鮮人ノ勞役團
長、山本ヨリ今シ方上陸セル若干ノ赤痢患者及ビ病

5578-18

氣ニナリタル若干ノ服務者ヲブロム收容所マデ貨物
自動車ニテ送還スル許可ヲ得タリ、出發前、山本ト
朝臣人選博士トノ間ニ烈シキ議論有リタル後、後者
(選博士)ハ大尉ノ演部ヲ殴打シ其ノ間山本ハ氣ヲ
附ケト叫ビツツ彼ノ向隅ヲ流リタリ、此ノ程度ニ對
シ憤慨ニ滿チテ、デ・ツィアース大尉ハ山本ノ質問
ニ對シテ次ノ如ク答ヘタリ即チ
『彼(デ・ツィアース)ハ曾テ日本人ト闘ヒ今日彼
ハ日本人ノ命令ニ服スルヲ餘儀ナクセラレ居ルコト
及ビ若シ機會有レバ彼ハ再ビ日本人ト闘フ可キコト』
ヲ答ヘタリ、其ノ時彼ハ鮮人、牧山ヨリ銃ノ台尻ヲ
以テスル合計四十回ノ殴打ヲ口部ニ受ケ且嚔ラレ且
押シ廻ハサレ其ノ間山本ハ彼ニ有ラユル柔術ノ手ヲ
試ミタリ、其レカラ間モ無ク軍曹坂本ハ再ビ其ノ場
ニ現ハレ彼ノ坂本ノヲ通ジテ、デ・ツィアース大尉
ハ彼ノ不審ヲ收容所司令官ニ話ス事ヲ得タリ
山本ハ之レニ關スル趣メテ表面的ニ皮相ナル質問ノ
間ニ其ノ折衝ノ理由ハ、デ・ツィアース大尉ガ一車
ニ二種ノ患者(上座ノ者及腰弱中ノ者)ヲ彼ニ知ラ
サズニ送りソノタメ困亂ヲ生ゼシメタルニ依ル旨ヲ
答辨シタリ其ノ折衝ノ結果ハ輕度ノ腦震盪血液ノ全
身滲出及永久不治ノ傷害ヲ生ゼシメタル右眼ノ重傷

5578-18

氣ニナリタル若干ノ服務者ヲブロム收容所マテ賞物
自動車ニテ送還スル許可ヲ得タリ、出發前、山本ト
朝臣人運轉士トノ間ニ烈シキ議論有リタル後、後者
(運轉士)ハ大尉ノ顔面ヲ毆打シ其ノ間山本ハ氣ヲ
附ケト叫ビツツ彼ノ向隅ヲ流リタリ、此ノ程度ニ對
シ憤慨ニ滿テテ、デ・ツィアース大尉ハ山本ノ質問
ニ對シテ次ノ如ク答ヘタリ即チ
『彼(デ・ツィアース)ハ曾テ日本人ト闘ヒ今日彼
ハ日本人ノ命令ニ服スルヲ餘儀ナクセラレ居ルコト
及ビ若シ機會有レバ彼ハ再ビ日本人ト闘フ可キコト』
ヲ答ヘタリ、其ノ時彼ハ歸人、牧山ヨリ銃ノ台尻ヲ
以テスル合計四十回ノ毆打ヲ口部ニ受ケ且嚔ラレ且
押シ廻ハサレ其ノ間山本ハ彼ニ有ラユル柔術ノ手ヲ
試ミタリ、其レカラ間モ無ク軍曹坂本ハ再ビ其ノ場
ニ現ハレ彼ノ坂本ノヲ逼ジテ、デ・ツィアース大尉
ハ彼ノ不審ヲ收容所司令官ニ話ス事ヲ得タリ
山本ハ之レニ對スル恠メテ表面的ニ皮相ナル質問ノ
間ニ其ノ折衝ノ理由ハ、デ・ツィアース大尉ガ一車
ニ二種ノ患者(上座ノ者及服務中ノ者)ヲ彼ニ知ラ
サズニ送リソノタメ困亂ヲ生ゼシメタルニ依ル旨ヲ
答辨シタリ其ノ折衝ノ結果ハ輕度ノ腦震盪血液ノ全
身滲出及永久不治ノ傷害ヲ生ゼシメタル右眼ノ重傷

5578-19

ナリキ、軍醫士官アイ・マリエンノ判断ニ依レバ此
ノ折檻ハデ・ツィアース大尉程ノ運動家デナイ場合
ニハ莫ノ者ヲ死ニ至ラシムルモノナリト言フ

事實ハ最初ノ船輪輸送（千九百四十四年十一月二十
七日）マデ最モヨイ時デ最初ノ二千七十九人ノ内ハ
百人ガ收容所外ノ彼等ノ勞役ヲ爲スコト可能ナリシ
コト而シテ最悪ノ場合參百五十人以内ノ者ガ可能ナ
リシコトナリ夫レ等ノ數字ハ事實ヲ雄辯ニ物語ル物
ナリ、第二ウルフ收容所ノ閉鎖後ブロム收容所ニ於
ケル病院ハ健康者部門ノ宿所ニ於ケル患者ヲ除外シ
テ常ニ壹千貳百人ノ患者ヲ有シタリ

病氣ノ種類。最初ノ赤痢病ノ突發中腸氣病ガ起リ始
メタリ一方其ノ後ニ於テマラリヤ傳染病發生シ該病
ハ事實上最後ニ至ルマデ繼續シタリ

日々多數ノ傳染性皮膚病及創痕傳染病有リタリ、赤
痢ハ最モ多クノ犠牲者ヲ有セリ一方ニ於テマラリヤ
殊ニ營地マラリア及中腸氣トテ所謂水脚氣ハ致命的
ナリキ、覆無キ漏澤式共同便所並ニ附近ノ厠舎ノ結
果トシテ蠅ノ禍ガ如何ニ赤痢病症ヲ増加セシメタル
カハ他ノ場所デ説明シアリ、他面マラリア傳染病ハ
露天生活時代及ブロム收容所ノ中央ニ於ケル蚊ノ發

5578-20

生スル濕地ノ出現ヨリ起レリ、宿舍設備、衛生資料
及藥品ノ缺如竝ニ粗悪ナ食料ハ病者ヲ増加セシメタ
リ
死亡、

死亡ノ數。後日ノ多數ノ死亡ヲ別ニシテ航海中二百
十三名ノ俘虜ハ死亡シタリ即チ二名ハ往航ニ於テ、
重名ハ歸還中汽車中ニ於テ而シテ二百八名ハフロ
ンスニ於テ病氣ノ爲死亡シ貳名ハ日本人ニ依リ殺サ
レタリ、左記ハ年齢組別ニ死亡ヲ示シタル表ナリ

年 齢	死亡 者數	對全死亡 者百分率	年 齢	死亡 者數	對全死亡 者百分率
不 明	15	7 %	自三十五才至四十才	35	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
二十五才マデ	20	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ %	自四十才至四十五才	54	26 %
自二十五才至三十才	17	8 %	自四十五才至五十才	35	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
自三十才至三十五才	31	15 %	自五十才至六十才	3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ %

死刑執行、謀殺

ヴァイツサー事件

千九百四十三年五月末日ヨリ二日後俘虜ヴァイツサー
ヲ受ケ持ツ部隊長ガ彼ノヴァイツサーノ見失ヘル時
ヴァイツサーハ兵收容所ノ東方若干軒米ノ地盤ヲ歩行

12-8655

シツツアル彼ヲ見付ケタル若干ノ日本水兵ニヨリ逮捕セラレタリトノ報告與ヘラレタリ

此ノ俘虜ガ收容所ヨリ逃亡シタルコトハ推定サレタルテラムモ何等確認ヘ行ヘレザリキ／

我々ハ審問及死刑執行ニ關スルイロイロノ事情ヨリ又夫等ノ事ノ有リタル日ニ於テ朝鮮衛兵ノ交代員ガ銃トシヤベルヲ持テテ行ツテ暫時ニシテ歸還スル豫定ニテ出デ行キタル事實ヨリ且又日本人通譯言葉ガドイツサイノリユツクサツクヲ持ツテイルノヲ見タ事實ヨリ彼／ドイツサイノガ死刑ニ處セラレタルコトヲ知レリ

今日ニ至ルマデ何處ニ於テ如何ナル方法デ而シテドノ審問ノ後デ此レガ（死刑ノ執行ガ）行ヘレタカ不明デアル

ボルグマン事件。ウルフ醫師、通譯ロツトガーリン
グ及豫備中尉エツテ・エツテ・ジェー・デ・フリー
スハ朝鮮人、大山ニ依リ近隣ノマレー式住宅ニ在リ
シ日本人收容所司令官ノトコロヘ呼ビ出サレタリ
（之レマデ知ラレザル一韓人衛兵ノ面前ニ於テ）ソ
レハ壹千九百四十五年六月七日夜九時ニ第一ウルフ
收容所ニ於テ二發ノ銃聲トソレニ續ク叫ビ聲ノ聞カ
レタル約半時間後ノ事ナリキ此ノ收容所司令官ハ逃

5578-22

亡ヲ試ミシ射殺セラレシ俘虜ヲ確認スベク命ジタル
モ質問ハ禁ゼラレタリ、其ノ家ヨリ若干ノ距離ノ所
ニ仰向キニ潰ハレル其ノ犠牲者（彼ノ口ヨリ少量ノ
血ガ流レ滴レリ）ハ彼ガボルグマンナルコトヲ告ゲ
タリ、彼ハウルフ醫師及デ・フリース中尉ニ對シ彼
ノ容態ハ絶望ニシテ一彈兩腕ヲ貫キ爲メニ最早救助
シ得ザルコトヲ耳語セリ

收容所司令官ノ所へ歸リ確認ノ結果報告ヲ爲シタル
後夫等ノ士官（前述ノ三人）ハ收容所ニ導カレ其ノ
後彼等ハ芦田ガ不知ノ衛兵ニ下命セルヲ聽ケリ

歸路彼等ハ第三回目ノ銃聲ヲ聽キタリ收容所ニ到着
スルヤ大山ハ其ノ犠牲者ノ部隊長（ジエレマ中尉）
ニ對シ擔架ヲ持チ六人ノ病院事務員（コスタラス及
ドライエツセンヲ含ム）ト共ニ馬來式住宅へ戻ル様
命令シタリ、彼等ノ隊長以下六名ノハボルグマンガ
彼ノ頭部貫通銃創ニテ死亡セルヲ發見セリ其ノ死体
ヲ火葬ニ附シ墓ニ埋メルタメ墓場ニ持ツテ來ル様ニ
トノ命令ヲ完遂シタル上其ノ病院事務員等ハ最初ノ
射撃ガ眞ニ胸部ヲ打ち貫キ而モ其ノ彈丸ガ若シ腕ガ
垂レ下ガリテ在リタルモノナレバ其ノ腕ヲ貫通シタ
ル管ノ状態ニ打ち込マレタル旨機ヲ見テ物語リタリ
／打ち込マレタル旨物語ル機會有リタリ／

（之レ其ノ銃聲ノ聲コヘタル時「兩手ヲ舉ゲ」ノ命

5578-23

令アリシ事ヲ示シ得ルモノナリ) ジエレマ中尉ハ翌
朝本件ニ關シテ虐待セラレタリ、 ウルフ・醫師ハ
此ノ事アリシ數週間後ニ大山ニ依リ死亡ノ元因トシ
テ赤痢ガ暴ゲラレオレル死亡證明ニ署名スルヲ餘儀
無クセラレタリ

證人 大尉 エー・シー・ジエー・デ・ツィアース
國民兵 シー・テリ・ブランツ
豫備中尉 エツチ・エツチ・ジエー・デ・フリース

四七番 マンガラソ
ベンドソ

